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Abstract—This paper considers an application of Dynamic
Game Theory with the goal of increasing the performance of a
Mobile Ad Hoc Network in relation to increasing packet delivery
ratio and reducing end-to-end delay by the strategic placement of
drones. A multi-stage sequential game of two players, each with
one drone is played out in a scenario depicted by a hexagonal
graph, obstacles such as forests are also included. The algorithm
for the game has been implemented in JavaScript and the results
show that the best strategic locations of the placement of the
drones can be established during the sequential moves of the
players. Results also show that the Nash Equilibrium is achieved
during play.
Index Terms—MANET; Game Theory; Nash Equilibria; Drone
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET) consists of a col-
lection of nodes (also called agents) with the capability of
communicating using wireless technology over a network
established between the agents. The collection of agents could
be devices such as mobile phones and tablets [1] or any other
portable device that is able to transmit and receive radio waves.
This forms a communications network without the need for
any pre-existing infrastructure, because of this MANETs are
quick to deploy [2].
There are many applications for a MANET ranging from
sharing files in a personal area network setting to streaming
video services between vehicles [3]. In this research we
consider a MANET facilitating communication in a disaster
recovery scenario after a natural catastrophe (i.e. after an
earthquake) which may have rendered any existing communi-
cations infrastructure unusable. Restoring communications in
this situation could potentially save lives [4], thus, the quick
deployment that a MANET offers would be invaluable in this
scenario.
This research builds upon research published in [5] by
introducing a more realistic environment by using hexagonal
grid formations, see Figure 1, which is more realistic in terms
of wireless transmission characteristics.
The nodes are split into two groups of agents. A graph is
used to represent the agents positions and the communication
links between the agents. The vertices of the graph identify the
positions of the agents and the edges have a unit length of 1. It
is assumed that when two agents have a unit length of one that
they are in direct communications range. Any agents on the
graph that have a unit length greater than one can communicate
using intermediate agents that form part of the path [6]. If an
agent becomes disconnected, i.e. is not connected to another
node, the agent is said to be isolated and can not communicate
with any other agent. In this paper we consider a connected
graph, therefore, there will not be any isolated agents.
Each group of agents is associated with a player, i.e., a
decision unit. The goal of the player is to minimize the
diameter of the graph formed by the respective agents. We
define the graph diameter as the maximum distance between
any two agents in the graph when the shortest path is followed.
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Fig. 1. A possible location of agents of a player on a hexagonal grid.
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Fig. 2. Sub-graph diameter is 11 is this case.
Each player is able to utilise a moving agent (drone) which
can be placed in different locations during the game, the
placement of the drone creates an extended graph. We define
a pay-off function as the difference in length between the
original diameter (before drone placement) and the diameter
of the extended graph (after node placement). The goal is
to achieve a reduction in the length of the diameter for the
extended graph in comparison to the initial graph - thus
creating a more optimal path.
The problem is formulated as a multi-stage sequential game
for two players which has been implemented using JavaScript.
The game results in a Nash equilibrium.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II Game For-
mulation defines the notation used, and the game settings,
the section also explains alternatives and the pay-off function.
Section III Nash Equilibria Algorithm defines the Nash Equi-
librium solution and presents the algorithm of obtaining such
a solution. Section IV discusses a particular example and a
numerical implementation is given. In Section V we conclude
and detail our future plans.
II. GAME FORMULATION
A. General network topology
Consider the set of players N = {1, ...,n}. Each player i∈N
has a non-empty set Mi 6= /0 of agents. Every agent is placed in
the vertices of a hexagonal grid W = {1, ...,Wx}×{1, ...,Wy}⊂
R2, where Wx,Wy ∈ R. The position of each agent ai ∈Mi is
characterised by a pair of positive coordinates vij = (x
j
i , y
j
i ) on
the hexagonal grid (see Figure 1). Note that the coordinates on
a hexagonal grid are defined in a specific coordinate system,
typically the axial coordinate system.
It is possible to position agents of different players in the
same vertex on the hexagonal grid. Stable communication
(vip,v
i
s) between agents v
i
p and v
i
s, s 6= p, of the ith player exists
if they are in the adjacent vertices on hexagonal grid. The two
agents considered for communication are those that are the
furthest apart (labelled as S and D on Figure 2).
Set of agents Vi = {vip ∈Mi, i∈N} and the set of established
communication links between them Ei = {(vip,vis),s 6= p}
define graph Ri = (Vi,Ei). The union of the graphs of all the
players defines the game graph R, with the non-empty finite
set of vertices V and finite set of non-ordered pairs of elements
from V, called edges of the graph E [7].
V =
n∪
i=1
Vi, E =
n∪
i=1
Ei.
Graph R defines the general network structure of the game,
which consists of |Wx×Wy| possible positions of the agents.
The number of unoccupied positions |O| can be roughly
estimated as [5]:
|Wx×Wy|− (n1 +n2 + ...+nN)≤ |O| ≤ |Wx×Wy|−max
i∈N
{ni}
If sub-graph Ri is connected, this guarantees the existence
of the path between any two vertices in Ri. Note that the two
graphs/sub-graphs are not connected with each other i.e. the
agents of different players do not connect nor do they interact
with each other.
A sequence e = (e1, ...,ek, ...) of edges in the sub-graph is
called a path in the sub-graph Ri, if the vertex adjacent to the
edge coincides with the vetrex adjacent to the next edge. Path
length of the path e= (e1, ...,ek) is denoted by d(e) = k [7].
The length of each edge on the hexagonal grid is equal to
1, therefore, the length of the edge ei is also 1.
The sub-graph diameter D(Ri) is defined to be the maximum
among all the shortest paths between any two agents in the
sub-graph, i.e. the shortest path for the two agents furthest
apart (see Figure 2).
D(Ri) = max
(vk,vl)∈Vi×Vi
d(vk,vl),
where d(vk,vl) is the path between vertices vk and vl .
Since each graph Ri is connected, the diameter can be
roughly estimated as [5] D(Ri)≤ |Mi|−1.
B. Mobile agents (drones)
Each player controls one mobile agent (drone) denoted by
qi for the ith player, i ∈ N (we associate drones with their
positions/coordinates on the grid), depicted in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Drone (denoted by a triangle) can be positioned on the grid.
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Fig. 4. Extended graph R∗ after the drone has joined the game.
A mobile agent can change its position on the hexagonal
grid (see Figure 3, where the mobile agent is represented by
a triangle).
Communication between a mobile agent and an agent is
exactly the same as an agent with another agent, they both
have identical transmission characteristics.
The additional feature drones offer is the ability to commu-
nicate with the agents of other players. Therefore, the strategic
placement of a mobile agent may be beneficial to both players
in terms of shortening their communication paths.
C. Initial deployment pattern
At the start of the game all drones are located in such
positions qi0, that the path length from a mobile agent to
another agent is greater than 1:
d(qi0,v
j
p)> 1, ∀p ∈Mi ∀i, j ∈ N.
It should be noted that a player is not initially concerned
with shortening paths of another player and places its mobile
agent for its own advantage only.
Subgraph R∗i is an extended graph of the ith player, if the
set of vertices is defined in the following way:
V (R∗i ) =Mi∪
n⋃
i=1
qi, i ∈ N,
and the set of edges is defined as the ability to communicate
on the set V (R∗i ). See Figure 4 which depicts the strategic
placement of a mobile agent and the new path shown using
red lines, resulting in a shorter diameter of 9, as opposed to
the original path as shown in Figure 2 which has a diameter
of 11.
D. Alternatives and the pay-off function
Each player aims to position its mobile agent such that the
diameter of its extended sub-graph is smaller than the diameter
of its original sub-graph.
The game is the one with complete information, i.e., each
player knows the location of all their own agents and of the
ones of another players; each player remembers all their own
moves and the moves of other players. The players take their
turns in a priori agreed order.
Denote by Wi the set of all available positions for the drone
of the ith player. We can limit this set by looking at a finite and
countable number of locations such that they do not increase
their own diameter. The way we limit the number of available
positions, is that we allow the drone to take the non-taken grid
vertices and the points in the centers of the cells. Hence, Wi
is the set of alternatives for player i.
Each turn, the ith player chooses an element from a set
of alternatives Wi built from all the available positions that
decrease the diameter of the extended graph, together with the
locations that do not change the diameter, but might minimize
the diameter of extended sub graph in the future. Thus, the set
Wi =W nowi ∪W hopei consists of:
• the alternatives, that decrease the diameter of the extended
sub graph of the ith player, denoted by W nowi
• the alternatives that do not change the diameter on the
current turn, however, we hope, will bring benefits later
(in the future) denoted by W hopei
In regards to the second subset, initially all players know
the number of available drones and all the locations of the
agents of other players, thus, at the initial state of the game
the players can reason towards the alternatives a few steps
ahead.
The search for hope alternatives can be formulated as
follows:
• Define the set W nowi as the set of all drone positions that
lead to decreasing the diameter.
• Set W hopei = /0. The ith player solve the the following
optimization problems:
q¯ih = argmin
qi∈W\V (Rexti )
D(R∗i ),
where Rexti is the graph Ri extended with N− 1 agents
and R∗i is Rexti extended with q
i
h.
• The search is to be performed over all possible Rexti . If
qih /∈W nowi , add it to W hopei , i.e., we set W hopei =W hopei ∪
qih.
The number of steps is limited since the number of mobile
agents is limited (each player has one mobile agent). For
the second player the number of alternatives to consider
is even smaller. The future benefit can reduce the game
length/duration, and also can result in better solutions. The
choice at the first step made by the ith player of such an
alternative (for the future benefits) leads to a zero pay-off at
the first step, H1i = 0.
Definition 1. An alternative wi is a hope alternative whope
in the two-players multi-stage game, if
• whope ∈W1∩W2, where Wi, i= 1,2 is the alternative of
the ith player
• H1i = 0, i= 1,2
• xs1 = x
p
2 and y
s
1 = y
p
2 , where (x
s
i ,y
s
i ) are the coordinates of
the sth agent of the ith player, s ∈Mi.
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Fig. 5. The initial topology of the game before it begins.
Note that for each set of alternatives at each step of the ith
player depends on the previous steps and previous steps of the
other player. Therefore, after the first step of each ith player
the following optimisation problem is solved [5]:
q¯i = argmin
qi∈Wi
D(Ri)
The game is optimising the mobile agent placement for a
search and rescue scenario, therefore, the player’s strategies
will be ”benevolent”, i.e. when there are two equivalent
alternatives, the ith player will choose the option which is more
advantages for other player [9]. In our case each player moves
their own mobile agents so that it does not increase the sub
graph diameter of another player. This process is formulated
in terms of a multi-stage game with complete information:
Γ= {N,W ,H}
where N is the set of players; W = ∏i∈NWi is a Cartesian
product of strategy sets Wi and Wi is the set of available
strategies for player i; H is a vector-valued function such that
for any given communication infrastructure G, Hi : W → R is
the utility (pay-off) function for player i.
The game is over when none of the players cannot reduce
the diameter of extended sub graph any further. The pay-off
function for the ith player is:
Hi = d(Ri)−d(R∗i )≥ 0 (1)
Therefore, this is formulated as a finite game with complete
information.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIA ALGORITHM
This section presents a numerical example that searches for
the Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. The solution QNE = {qNEi }, i ∈ N is said to be
the Nash equilibrium solution if for any i ∈ N the following
holds:
Hi(G,QNE)≥ Hi(G,QNE−i )
where QNE−i = {qNEj }∪{qi}, j 6= i, qi ∈Wi .
A. The Algorithm for Searching for the Nash Equilibrium
In section II-D we have considered the following alterna-
tives:
1) the first player searches for the hope alternatives (Defi-
nition 1) and for alternatives which reduces the diameter
of sub graph R1;
2) the first player computes a pay-off function for the
alternatives found at step 1. By definition 1 for the
hope alternative pay-off function will be zero for the
first player, therefore, we do not have to compute the
pay-off function for the hope alternatives;
3) the second player searches only for alternatives which
reduces the diameter of sub graph R2;
4) the second player computes a pay-off function for the
alternatives found. This might be final the step.
5) if the previous step was not final, the first player searches
for alternatives which reduce the diameter of the sub
graph R1;
6) then repeat the algorithm from step 3 until condition
II-D is satisfied.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
A. Simulation software
The game has been implemented using JavaScript. During
the initialisation stage each player are given the coordinates of
the agents, four arrays are used to store these coordinates, X
for player 1,Y for player 1,X for player 2 and Y for player 2.
Then several draw functions are called which creates a visual
representation of the graph, the agents and the obstacles.
A Dijkstra algorithm [10] is used to create a distance matrix
for the agents, one for each player. The longest path is then
calculated for each player using their distance matrix. All
possible coordinates for the drone are obtained and stored in a
vector, each player maintains it own drone coordinate vector.
For each possible location of each players drone, the al-
gorithm places the drone at that location which results in
an extended graph. The diameter of the extended graph is
calculated.
The difference between the diameter of the original graph
and the diameter of the extended graph is used to give the
value of the payoff function. The code follows the algorithm
presented in Section III-A.
B. Example
In the following example, the initial state of the game for
the two players is discussed and depicted in Figure 5. The
drones are not yet the part of the network and thus are not
included in Figure 5 because they are not connected to any
agents initially. The agents of the first player are depicted by
red circles. The agents of the second player are depicted by
black circles. The agents of both players are present at the
same location in places. The green areas represent obstacles
such as lakes or forests.
The initial diameters in 5 are d(R1) = 22,d(R2) = 15.
TABLE I
SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIES FOR BOTH STAGES
No. alternative First Player Drone first Pay-off Second Player Drone pay-off function
1 A(3
√
3; 1.5) (1; 1) N(4.5
√
3, 3) (1; 3)
2 B(2.5
√
3; 3) (1; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (2; 1)
3 C(2.5
√
3; 6) (2; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (3; 1)
4 D(3
√
3; 5.5) (2; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (3; 1)
5 E(3.5
√
3; 6) (1; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (2; 1)
6 F(4.5
√
3; 6) (2; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (3; 1)
7 G(4.5
√
3; 7) (2; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (3; 1)
8 H(4
√
3; 4.5) (0; 0) K(3.5
√
3, 4) (7; 3)
9 I(5.5
√
3; 6) (1; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (2; 1)
10 J(6.5
√
3; 6) (1; 0) A(3
√
3, 1.5) (2; 1)
11 K(3.5
√
3; 4) (0; 0) H(4
√
3, 4.5) (7; 3)
K(3.5
√
3; 4) (0; 0) M(3.5
√
3, 5) (6; 2)
12 L(4
√
3; 3.5) (0; 0) K(3.5
√
3, 4) (6; 3)
13 M(3.5
√
3; 5) (0; 0) K(3.5
√
3, 4) (6; 2)
C. Using algorithm for searching Nash equilibrium
The algorithm presented in section III-A was implemented
in JavaScript, and the above game was simulated. The algo-
rithm shows that optimal paths were created by the stategic
placement of drones using a game theory approach.
Table I presents the results and shows alternatives found
for the first player by implementing steps 1 and 2 of the
algorithm discussed in section III-A, the alternatives are in
the second column of the Table. The set of alternatives of the
first player is W1 and contains 13 potential drone positions
A–M with the corresponding changes in the diameters listed
in the third column. The set of hope alternatives W hope1 ⊂W1
are highlighted in bold in table I, and they are
W hope1 = {H,K,L,M}
None of the alternatives bring a decrease in the diameter at
this stage. Figure 6 presents the alternatives for the first player,
the hope alternatives are depicted by blue stars (see also bold
rows in Table I).
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Fig. 6. Alternatives of the first player .
The remaining alternatives W1 \W hope1 are currently opti-
mising the diameter and are represented by blue circles.
Table I also presents the alternatives for the second player
by implementing step 3 and 4 of algorithm presented in section
III-A.
Hope alternatives are highlighted in bold, see also Figure
7 which corresponds to the alternatives. The mobile agents
appear on Figure 7 which are represented by blue stars and
show the possible beneficial locations of the first player. The
mobile agent for the second player is denoted by yellow
diamonds.
The situation is quite different now, comparing the final
pay-offs (listed in the fifth column of the Table), one can
see that the best diameter decrease was due to the hope
alternatives W hope1 = {H,K,L,M}, with the following results:
drones placed at H,K in whichever order, give a payoff value
of 7 and 3 correspondingly to the first and second player;
drones placed at K,M in whichever order, give payoff of 6
and 2 correspondingly to the first and second player; drones
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Fig. 7. Hope alternatives resulted in optimisation
placed at L,K, give payoff of 6 and 3 correspondingly to the
first and second player.
After this step the game is over because the players alterna-
tives have been exhausted, which means that the diameters of
their sub graphs R1, R2 can not be further reduced. The found
alternatives K,H give us d(R∗1) = 15 and d(R
∗
2) = 12 which
are the Nash equilibria, because they satisfy definition 2. The
discussion of the uniqueness of Nash equilibria is outside the
scope of this work.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends the findings in [5] by implementing a
hexagonal topology rather than a topology made up of squares.
This research also found new classes of solutions. This novel
approach and introduction of new types of alternatives allowed
us to define a finite multi-stage game with complete informa-
tion, which led to the Nash Equilibrium. Our future research
will consider more players with the optionality of allowing
variable numbers of mobile agents between the players.
Other future work in this area may consist of creating a
Cooperative framework of the game, for example Cooperative
solutions for the network structure such as Shapley value,
Core, Mayerson, Owen, and Aumann-Dreze vectors.
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